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Three recent Canadian public health crises present an illustration of both the opportunities 
for reform and the challenges that may impede progress and public health renewal in 
federalist nations. While the three crises examined exposed serious flaws in emergency 
preparedness and fuelled demands for vital public health reform, evidence indicates that 
fundamental challenges have not been addressed and may have even heightened over the 
last decade given a move to “open federalism” and the significant fiscal impacts of ongoing 
austerity measures.  With future pandemics inevitable, we identify the missed opportunities 
to optimize Canada’s emergency response capacity and procedures and examine the 
seemingly intractable barriers of federalism and path dependency thinking that continue to 
impede learning and reform and ultimately undermine effective disaster management 
 
 
    n Canada, authority for public health management and emergency response is shared 
between all three levels of government: federal, provincial, and municipal.  This creates a 
complex public policy environment that presents significant challenges most visibly and often 
distressingly in the context of emergency response and public health renewal.  Three recent 
Canadian public health crises present an illustration of both the opportunities for reform and 
the challenges that may impede progress and public health renewal in other federalist nations 
such as the United States.  
In 2003, Canada saw a provincial outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS).  Following the outbreak, scathing criticism of Canada’s health units emerged.  SARS 
had tested Canada’s public health systems, showing them to be “woefully inadequate” 
(Bretscher et al. 2010).  The serious challenges presented by SARS were seen as a rare 
opportunity to reform and invest in public health in Canada and ensure that vital emergency 
preparedness systems were up to the task and prompted major reforms and significant 
economic investment across all three levels of government.  In just a few years, Canada 
suffered two more public health emergencies: the 2008 listeriosis outbreak and the 2008-2009 
H1N1 novel influenza pandemic.  In spite of major institutional reforms and significant 
investment, Canada’s public health systems were again chastised for serious deficiencies, 
forcing critics to conclude that the hard fundamental lessons from 2003 had not been learned 
and addressed.  
Our paper draws on numerous inquiries and reports that have revealed a recurring 
pattern of managerial and institutional frailties including poor coordination, integration and 
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communication; weak leadership; inadequate strategic planning, monitoring and surveillance; 
bureaucratic inflexibility and lack of adaptive capacity; and blurred lines of authority and 
flawed procurement and vaccine supply chains. While it is possible to analyse and explain 
the findings using a range of organisational and public management theories, our main 
contention is that the failings highlighted are largely symptomatic of the deeper tensions and 
politics generated by Canadian federalism. Consequently we focus on the seemingly 
intractable challenges that federalism presents for emergency preparedness in the context of 
preparing for future pandemic threats.   
By analyzing three of Canada’s major public health emergencies of the last decade, 
we also identify opportunities for public health reform. In particular, we highlight the need 
for increased federal leadership and oversight in public health emergencies; the need for 
continued economic investments, but with enhanced oversight; and the development of 
coordinated intergovernmental relationships and communication protocols that transcend 
strict jurisdictional boundaries.  
In advocating for these reforms, we also recognize and argue that in Canada the 
challenges of federalism may have heightened over the last decade in tandem with the federal 
government’s adoption of a laissez–faire approach to intergovernmental relations under the 
current Prime Minister, Stephen Harper. Coined “open federalism” it has also been labeled 
“absentee federalism” by critics due to the Harper government’s reluctance to play a national 
coordinating role.  Furthermore, the fiscal resource base of the federal public health agency 
has been severely impacted by the government’s ongoing austerity measures and media and 
public fears concerning the threat of pandemics such as avian flu appears to have waned. 
Consequently, ten years after SARS provided a “window” for substantive reform of public 
health and emergency management in Canada, the opportunity to learn from previous 
mistakes and adapt for future emergencies appears to have diminished substantially.   
With future pandemics inevitable, we identify the missed opportunities to optimize 
Canada’s emergency response capacity and procedures for emergency reform, and examine 
the significant barriers presented by federalism, political ideology and path dependent 
thinking that continue to impede learning and undermine effective emergency preparedness 
and response. While focused on Canada, we believe the paper may have wider implications 
for the latest multilateral North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza 
(NAPAPI) drafted in 2012.  Given the extremely high level of integration between Canada 
and the United States and between Mexico and the United States, the launch of a North 
American pandemic plan makes obvious sense.  That said if collaboration and cooperation 
between levels of government in a single country appears to be unrealistic it does not bode 
well for international agreements that have yet to be tested. 
We begin by examining Canadian federalism and the constraints and challenges that 
this poses for emergency preparedness and response.  We then outline and analyze the three 
case studies, drawing out the key implications and themes, and conclude by assessing the 
prospects and options for future reform.     
 
FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN CANADA 
In Canada, responsibility for public health and emergency response is shared 
between federal, provincial-territorial, and municipal governments.  These complex 
jurisdictional and institutional arrangements for public health can be traced back to the broad 
and decentralized nature of providing public health across a geographically massive country 
and the lack of explicit jurisdiction given when such lines of authority were drawn in the 
Constitution Act, 1867.    
Canada’s geographical challenges and constitutional constraints have given rise to 
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institutional and organizational tensions within the overall governance structure.  In addition 
to collaborative working relationships that extend “vertically,” between the federal, 
provincial (state) and municipal levels of government, there is also evidence of “horizontal” 
governance in Canada’s political institutions.  Many organizations work in tandem with, and 
alongside, other peer organizations at the same level of government.  For example, the Public 
Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) works alongside the federal department Health Canada on 
many issues related to health.  In addition, safety issues related to food are handled by three 
federal entities: the Canada Food Inspection Agency, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and 
Health Canada.  In this way fragmentation in vertical governance is further accompanied by 
fragmentation in horizontal governance (Bakvis and Skogstad 2007). Consequently, the 
division of responsibility across multiple organizations at the same level of government 
further compounds the complexity of assigning responsibility or authority for many public 
health issues.   
The polycentric and disparate context of health in Canada should not be 
underestimated.  As Fierlbeck notes, “if one area of public administration best exemplifies 
the interdependent nature of modern governance, it is that of public health (Fierlbeck 2010, 
2). This presents a number of specific challenges for policymaking and coordination when it 
comes to planning for emergency preparedness and response. 
Typically, interdependence creates a governance structure in which multiple actors 
share responsibility for outcomes. This sharing can lead to difficulties defining tasks and 
developing clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Above all else, effective 
emergency responses demand seamless, expedient actions facilitated by a clear chain of 
command.  A lack of clarity and ill-defined roles will necessarily hinder well-coordinated 
responses and can instill complacency based on the oft- mistaken belief that “someone else” 
will deal with the crisis.  The second main challenge to policymaking presented by federalism 
concerns the impact of interdependence on decision-making.  As decentralized governance 
structures grant authority and status to a multitude of potential actors, they can also render 
the creation of a gridlock effect termed a “joint decision trap” by McDougall (2009).  When, 
as a result of jurisdictional considerations, no level of government is able to act alone without 
formal agreement from all governments, McDougall predicts that “default decision-making” 
and “frozen institutional arrangements” will typically result (2009).   
Three recent public health crises underline key challenges  presented by these 
institutional arrangements for emergency response in Canada and provide excellent case 
studies: the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the reform 
efforts made in its wake, the handling of the 2008 outbreak of listerioris, a foodborne illness, 
and, third, the 2008-2009 novel flu pandemic, H1N1.We address them in chronological order, 
as (in addition to being interested in each individual case), we are also looking to capture the 
degree of learning, adaptation and reform that resulted over the entire period.     
 
CRITICAL INCIDENTS: THREE “MOMENTS OF TRUTH” 
 
2003: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS):  
The first cases of SARS among humans emerged in a southern province of China in 
the winter of 2002.  By 2003, SARS had spread not only to neighbouring Hong Kong, but 
also to Canada.  In July 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that Canada 
had seen 251 probable cases of SARS and 43 deaths had been attributed to the disease 
(Naylor, Chantler, and Griffiths 2004).   
While the actual outbreak of SARS was unavoidable, criticism surfaced regarding 
aspects of the response.  Doubt arose that perhaps it could have been contained earlier.  As a 
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result of perceived failures, a key question emerged: did the failures simply reflect the 
inherent difficulties in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophes?  Or 
were the impacts of SARS the result of oversights or neglect that could have been avoided?  
Perhaps testament to suspicions of the latter, three major committees were formed, each 
charged with producing their own authoritative report.  These were: the National Advisory 
Committee on SARS and Public Health (The Naylor Report 2003); the Ontario Expert Panel 
on SARS and Infectious Disease Control (The Walker Report); and the Ontario SARS 
Commission (The Campbell Report, 2004-2006). 
All three of the reports commissioned after SARS concluded that the response was 
less than adequate.  Their conclusions identified elementary mistakes and oversights that were 
deemed to be unreasonable for an advanced health care system to fall victim to.  As stated in 
the Campbell Report, “SARS showed Ontario’s central public health system to be 
unprepared, fragmented, poorly led, uncoordinated, inadequately resourced, professionally 
impoverished, and generally incapable of discharging its mandate” (Campbell 2004).  
Investigators focused on the processes and systems established to deal with the outbreak.   
Evidence provided to the investigators confirmed that mistakes were made and that the 
devastation wrought by SARS was not merely the result of the inherent difficulties in 
containing such an outbreak.  Rather, as the Campbell Commission concludes, “it is likely 
that [Toronto’s first outbreak of] SARS could have been contained more quickly and with 
less damage had the right systems been in place in Ontario” (Campbell 2004). 
The Campbell Commission alone highlights a lengthy list of twenty-three major 
problems faced over the course of the SARS outbreak in Toronto.  These problems range 
from the declining investment in public health, a lack of transparency, a lack of preparedness, 
a lack of laboratory capacity, inadequate infectious disease information systems, blockages 
of vital information, lack of central expertise, and poor coordination with the federal 
government (Campbell 2004). 
Similar criticisms were echoed in the other two reports.   The jurisdictional issues also 
featured prominently in subsequent academic papers and reports:   
In addition to the lack of capacity and planning in the health system to deal with SARS, 
Ontario faced serious jurisdictional issues. Who was responsible for government’s 
response to the crisis? The Ministry of Health and Long Term Care and the 
Commission for Public Health are legally responsible for health emergencies, while 
the Ministry of Public Security and Safety and the Commissioner for Public Safety are 
legally responsible for emergencies affecting the entire province.  In the ex post 
analysis of the SARS crisis, jurisdictional conflicts made it evident that the 
government needed clear lines of authority for decision making. (Bretscher et al. 2010) 
The World Health Organization also commented on Canada’s relatively poor performance in 
containing and dealing with SARS, noting that the major shortcoming was a “lack of 
intergovernmental communication” (Wilson and MacLennan 2005). A key finding was that, 
during SARS, the province of Ontario did not readily communicate data to the federal 
government because there was no legislation that obligated them to do so, and there was much 
confusion regarding the impact of privacy rights on information sharing between the 
provinces and the federal government (Campbell 2004).   
Lacking clear lines of authority, central direction and leadership, many government 
officials became involved and several acted as spokespeople to the media on behalf of 
Canada, often presenting conflicting or confusing information.  The absence of clear direction 
was unsettling not only for the population, but it also caused “many local Medical Officers 
of Health [to feel] abandoned during SARS, devoid of support and guidance” (Campbell 
2004). 
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Compounding these difficulties, Ontario had no plan for pandemic response in place 
at the time of the SARS outbreak (Campbell 2004). Pandemic plans establish a process for a 
staged response and are of value in establishing ultimate authority for the management of 
outbreaks, a chain of command that was, in fact, never clarified or established during the 
SARS outbreak. 
In the wake of SARS, and the resulting investigations, there emerged a growing 
consensus among government officials that Canada’s public health systems were not up to 
the task and improvements were needed. The shock and fall-out from SARS prompted many 
to focus on much-needed public health renewal in Canada.  According to one report published 
by the federal department, Health Canada:1 
The lessons learned from SARS are critical pieces of information for determining 
the improvements needed in Canada’s public health system…the knowledge gained 
from SARS should help Canada put in place a public health system that will be 
capable of not only dealing with the next outbreak, but the next pandemic. (Public 
Health Agency of Canada 2003). 
A desire to update and strengthen public health was evident. Many social scientists have long 
spoken about the impacts of “focusing events” – sudden catastrophes, often unexpected, that 
may advance policy issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon 
1995).  In this way, the devastating circumstance of the SARS outbreak functioned in this 
manner - it highlighted problems demanding attention.  Subsequently, this outbreak 
galvanized government resources, political will, and public health investment.   
By putting public health reform firmly on the agenda, SARS would serve as a 
catalyst for the many reforms that would occur over the next few years. Major changes did 
occur after the 2003 outbreak: for example, the federal budget of February 2004 committed a 
sizeable 665 million dollars (CAD) to the task of strengthening the country’s public health 
system. Second, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) was established on September 
24, 2004 to serve as the main agency responsible for public health in Canada and to provide 
federal leadership in health programs, research, surveillance, and emergency response. Third, 
a new intergovernmental mechanism termed the “Pan-Canadian Public Health Network” was 
formed to support the mitigation of public health challenges.  The network is intended to link 
federal, provincial, and territorial health operations, assist during emergencies, collaborate on 
day-to-day operations of public health and provide advice and reporting to the Deputy 
Ministers of Health. The network’s objectives demonstrated considerable potential because 
they were based on an understanding of the challenges posed by federalism and offered a 
concrete, realistic solution to the diffuse system. 
In spite of the reforms made, a number of important changes suggested in the reports 
were overlooked that could, and perhaps should, have been made. For example, legislation 
that would obligate the provinces to share health surveillance information with the federal 
government was not developed in the years after the SARS outbreak.  Such data collection is 
necessary to undertake effective national health surveillance and to help ensure early 
detection of emerging outbreaks and to trigger early interventions.   
In addition, fundamental issues in Canada’s emergency management legislation 
were not amended after the SARS outbreak.  Current regulations are written in such a way 
that the federal government is not permitted to unilaterally engage in disaster relief if the 
emergency is contained within one province; intervention is only permissible once the 
                                                          
1 Authorship of this report was later transferred to the Public Health Agency of Canada 
upon the agency’s creation in 2004. 
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disaster has already spread across a provincial border (Wilson 2006). As an area of 
policymaking, there are key aspects of pandemic response that justify a centralized approach: 
aggressive early intervention is required, significant resources are needed, and the 
consequences could be significant for both Canadian citizens and international citizens “if a 
province sought to address the challenge on its own and failed” (Wilson 2006, 38).  However, 
even after the SARS crisis, legislation was not amended to give the federal government the 
authority to intervene.  Such inaction seemingly reflects the reluctance of Canadians to 
engage in reforms that involve constitutional change or changes in entrenched federal-
provincial relations and powers.  Lack of legislative change in this area contributed to the 
development of a key barrier that would later impede implementation of the policy changes 
under consideration: the federal government simply lacked the authority to undertake 
appropriate actions. 
 
2008 Listeriosis outbreak reforms tested 
Although the reforms following SARS were not as far reaching as some had hoped 
for, they were, nonetheless, significant and well-funded, owing to SARS’ role as a focusing 
event.  Five years after the SARS outbreak, these reforms were put to the test as Canada was 
again host to another public health emergency. In 2008, an outbreak of listeriosis arose as a 
result of contamination by the listeria bacterium at a Maple Leaf Foods meat packing plant in 
Toronto.  This would become, according to investigator Sheila Weatherill, “one of the worst 
foodborne illness emergencies in Canadian history” (Weatherill 2009).   
Foodborne illness response, just like pandemic response, is marked by a similar set 
of complex intergovernmental relations.  This area of response is also a prime example of 
fragmented horizontal as well as vertical governance structures.  The federal department of 
Health Canada develops policies and standards for the nutritional composition, quality, and 
safety of food.  In addition, Health Canada works with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
(CFIA) to produce legislation regarding food inspection in tandem with other federal 
departments such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Agriculture and Agri-Food 
Canada.  Furthermore, provincial-territorial and federal governments both carry out food 
inspection and the roles of local governmental organizations (municipalities, regional health 
authorities, and local health units) vary across the country (Gabler 2008).   
Federalism remained a key issue and an underlying factor in the ineffectual 
implementation of the proposed changes. As in the case of SARS, many of the same 
challenges arose and yet, in spite of the reforms and added safeguards, Canada’s public health 
systems were again criticized for their inability to clarify roles and responsibilities between 
the almost fifty local, provincial, and federal partners who were involved in the response.  
According to a major report commissioned by the Government of Canada, “no single 
organization took the overall role of coordinating the actions of various parties involved.” As 
a result, a “vacuum in senior leadership” was created, causing “confusion and weak decision-
making” (Weatherill 2009).   
Many Canadians were clearly concerned and affected by the notable absence of 
leadership.  During the crisis, both the provincial and federal governments and the private 
company implicated issued their own news announcements. There was confusion regarding 
why the Chief Public Health Officer - head of PHAC and an individual responsible to report 
to the Minister of Health - was not providing the leading national voice as intended following 
the post-SARS reforms (Wilson and Keelan 2008).  According to the Weatherill report, such 
a multiplicity of authorities fueled misunderstanding and anxiety and prevented Canadians 
from understanding which level of government was in charge of the crisis.  Once again, 
jurisdictional ambiguity severely hindered emergency response and resulted in an ill-
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coordinated effort marked by poor communication to the public. 
The Weatherill report noted further significant shortcoming in the federal 
government’s attempts to manage the crisis.  An intergovernmental agreement detailing best 
practices for the handling of foodborne outbreaks was in existence, having been ratified by 
federal and provincial-territorial governments in 2004, but few of those involved with the 
listeriosis outbreak were even familiar with the agreement, titled the “Foodborne Illness 
Outbreak Response Protocol” and it was never formally activated during the crisis.  While 
the need for intergovernmental cooperation was recognized in the same report, a lack of 
tangible and sustained measures ensured that jurisdictional ambiguity persisted once the 
outbreak occurred. 
Criticisms regarding poor central organization were particularly disappointing in 
light of the newly minted reforms.  The expenditures needed to create PHAC in the wake of 
SARS were justified to the public on the basis that the new federal agency would play a key 
role in the management of public health emergencies.  However, PHAC had not yet provided 
the necessary clarification of roles and responsibilities that it had been tasked with and a 
further round of blame, excuses and obfuscation ensued. 
 
2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak: confirming fears  
 As we have outlined, the SARS and listeriosis outbreaks renewed concerns about 
federal-provincial coordination of emergency planning and highlighted severe weaknesses in 
both responses.  In 2009, Canada was host to another public health crisis: the H1N1 influenza 
outbreak.  This provided a further test and another opportunity to adapt and improve.   
In April 2009, an outbreak of an influenza-like illness occurred in Mexico.  The 
Centre for Disease Control in the United States reported seven cases of a novel A/H1N1 
influenza.  Shortly thereafter, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared H1N1 a 
pandemic. There was speculation that the new virus might result in illness and death on a 
massive scale and cripple global trade. To put it bluntly, “it was feared that the H1N1 
pandemic of 2009 was the next Spanish Flu” (Bretscher et al. 2010). By early February 2010, 
Canada had 33,477 cases of H1N1 and 348 deaths had been caused by the outbreak (CHICA 
2010). Public response to the government’s actions was exceedingly negative.  As Maclean’s 
reported: “most Canadians have reached the same conclusion: the country’s public health 
authorities – federal, provincial, and local – have failed us miserably” (Friscolanti and Guilli 
2009).   
The vast majority of the problems experienced during the H1N1 outbreak occurred 
in relation to the rollout of the vaccine, which again illustrated the problem of shared and 
ambiguous responsibilities.  The inoculation campaign intended to lessen the impact of the 
virus in fact exposed major inconsistencies across provinces and regions, poor 
implementation, and no national standards.  To contextualize this discussion, it is worth 
noting that all vaccination plans were limited because there were ongoing problems with 
supply shortfalls that resulted from production limitations at GlaxoSmithKlein, the company 
responsible for manufacturing Canada’s H1N1 vaccines.  As a result, most of the provinces 
and territories waited on delayed shipments of the vaccine, many of which arrived with 
substantially fewer doses than promised.   
Amid shortages of the H1N1 vaccine, equitable distribution of the vaccines became a 
prime concern, and this was where the federal government failed in its attempts to deal with 
the situation. News reports criticized the inoculation campaign’s relative lack of national 
standards.  The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) reported that, the H1N1 
inoculation campaign exemplified a “patchwork” of varying provincial, municipal, and even 
regional regimes. There was “precious little in the way of consistency or uniformity in terms 
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of rolling out the vaccine from one coast to another” (McKenna 2009).   
A particularly controversial example of the lack of uniformity occurred in the 
Canadian province of Alberta.  Amid supply shortfalls, the Public Health Agency of Canada 
determined that the vaccine should be rolled out on a priority basis, with those who would 
benefit most to receive it first in order to minimize serious illness and overall death (Public 
Health Agency of Canada 2010).  However, during the H1N1 outbreak, the then Premier of 
Alberta, Ed Stelmach, called Alberta the “province that is offering flu vaccines for every 
Albertan, not just to the high-risk groups” (Friscolanti and Guilli 2009). This contradicted 
PHAC’s stated strategy to provide doses to every province with the understanding that they 
would be reserved for high-risk groups, in part to provide greater protection for the herd.  
Premier Stelmach’s comments were indicative, however, of the independence and capacity 
for inconsistent approaches that the provinces could take in the absence of more coercive, 
national legislation or oversight – yet another result of federalism. A coordinated inoculation 
regime did not occur. Instead, Canadian citizens across the country were provided with 
varying levels of treatment according to where they lived. 
In addition to the lack of national standards, inequity was also a key concern in 
respect of which groups were entitled to receive the vaccine.  Those groups considered to be 
most at risk were instructed to go for their immunizations first, but in many instances little or 
nothing was done to turn away low priority individuals who were determined to get their 
“shots” early.  High profile examples of queue jumping caused further outrage when it was 
found that that board members of certain hospitals secured advanced access to the flu shots 
and even some professional NHL hockey teams were given the vaccine early at their rinks 
(Wingrove, Paperny, and Walton 2009), while at risk groups, including the elderly and the 
very young, were expected to wait in the seemingly endless lines that formed each day.   
Not only were people inconvenienced (or put off altogether) by standing in line for 
several hours, but the system risked exposing healthy and at risk groups to those who were 
already infected.  Effective pandemic and infection control discourages large social 
gatherings and require the sick to be isolated, but the vaccination procedure appeared to 
violate both these measures and actually increased the likelihood of contagion.   
The public and the media were highly critical of the way the immunization process 
was handled and even the Chief Medical Officer of Ontario accepted that it was far from 
satisfactory:   
The picture, presented repeatedly by the media, of people lining up for hours 
to get themselves and their children immunized was a disturbing one. It hinted 
at possible widespread panic, and a system not able to cope.  Neither of those 
things, as it turned out, was true, but there is no question that the H1N1 
immunization process could have been better handled.  It boiled down to 
problems of supply and capacity. (Ontario Chief Medical Officer, 2010, 13)  
Although Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health was prepared to acknowledge some of 
the provincial failings in his report, federal ministers were adamant that they bore no 
responsibility since health matters, including vaccinations, are a provincial matter.   
When asked in an interview if Ottawa bears any blame for the flawed vaccine 
rollout in Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario, which saw just over a third of their 
populations inoculated against the pandemic virus, Health Minister Leona 
Aglukkaq responded: “Provinces and territories deliver health care.” 
(Alphonso 2012) 
Provinces, on the other hand, argued that their planning was curtailed by a lack of 
clarity regarding the quantity of vaccine they would receive each week from the federal 
government.  As a result of the constant jurisdictional squabbling and intergovernmental “turf 
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wars,” Alphonso believes the public “grew impatient, confused and eventually turned off 
from the vaccine,” which may help explain why the take up rates in some provinces was less 
than a third (2012).  The next section explores these themes further in the context of possible 
reforms. 
 
ANALYSIS: THEMES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH REFORM 
The three infectious outbreaks studied, and the numerous inquiries they triggered, 
highlight three central themes for public health reform in Canada.  First, the case studies 
signify the need to develop coordinated and cooperative intergovernmental relationships.  As 
Bretscher et al. conclude, “[t]he SARS crisis demonstrated that all orders of government 
needed to develop an integrated and effective pandemic plan, while putting the appropriate 
institutions in place to deal with a future crisis” (2010).  
 Despite investments in public health that were made in the wake of SARS, ongoing 
challenges of intergovernmental cooperation have not fully been addressed and, as such, there 
remains a gap between policy and practice in this area of public health reform.  In spite of 
cooperative rhetoric and several new institutions, federalism continues to promote and sustain 
jurisdictional ambiguity in emergency response and provides fundamental barriers that 
remain firmly entrenched in spite of a decade of reform and considerable investment. 
Analysis of these three case studies highlights a number of barriers faced: imperfect 
coordination and those in authority were unable to demand compliance – in particular due to 
a lack of enforceable federal oversight under current emergency management protocol. These 
problems, however, have their roots in federalism and its resultant system of diffuse 
responsibility and a multiplicity of actors and agents.  What is perhaps most interesting is that 
reforms such as the creation of PHAC and the pan-Canadian Public Health Network reflect 
the knowledge that intergovernmental cooperation is imperative.  However, efforts to 
facilitate and institutionalize cooperation remain largely ineffectual in the absence of 
intergovernmental negotiations to further clarify roles and responsibilities.  Jurisdictional 
ambiguity, and a seeming lack of ability to address the constitutional authority for public 
health, is an ongoing concern as failure to confront the broader jurisdictional aspects ensures 
that emergency response will continue to undermine the institutional and procedural reforms 
that have been undertaken.  
Second, the case studies demonstrate that while the involvement of local 
governments is critical, there is a need for increased federal leadership and oversight in public 
health emergencies.  There are key elements of emergency response that necessitate strong 
federal leadership: public health emergencies demand a rapid response, seamless integration 
across the country, and tremendous resources.  Pandemics such as SARS pose serious threats 
to populations globally and not just within national borders.  Any failure to appropriately 
contain or limit the spread of an outbreak could have significant repercussions for neighboring 
countries and beyond, which creates an added responsibility to respond effectively to public 
health crises.   
There are distinct advantages to a response led by the federal government: a single 
representative body organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), a clear line 
of accountability and responsibility, a coordinating body, and a strong resource base that can 
be engaged at short notice including the military and scientists. Under the rules of the WHO, 
reporting responsibility for disease outbreaks rests with the national government. Ottawa’s 
delay in reporting new cases to the WHO headquarters in Geneva resulted in a lack of timely 
information from Ontario, undermining  confidence that the situation was under control and 
ultimately prompting the WHO to issue a travel advisory against travelling to Toronto 
(Branswell 2013).  
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Effective communication within the country, to citizens and government 
representatives alike, also requires a well-defined federal role. Effective communication with 
the public is critically important to managing an outbreak.  As Bretscher et al. (2010) point 
out, maintaining the trust of the media and general public is crucially important to ensure 
compliance with public health measures. In order to establish trust, the government’s 
response to an emergency must appear to be effective, credible and orderly. In each of the 
three cases we analyzed, the sharing of responsibility for communication between different 
levels of government and various agencies appeared to undermine trust and confidence 
through the provision of different, and often contradictory, advice and information. SARS 
and H1N1, in particular, revealed major weaknesses in inter-jurisdictional communication, 
and highlighted the need for better local, national and international reporting and 
communication.  
Third, there is a need for continued economic investments in public health.   Clearly, 
the lack of vaccine supplies (as witnessed in the H1N1 case) not only increases the risks of 
the virus spreading but also engenders a sense of panic among the public.  While governments 
may not be able to purchase or store sufficient vaccines, even if they exist, they need to ensure 
that they are distributed in a timely fashion and target the highest-risk groups first.   
Although we, and a number of the reports cited, argue for more investment in public 
health and emergency preparedness, this has to be managed wisely if benefits are to be 
realized and public support for further investment is to be maintained.   A number of issues 
came to light in the case studies, suggesting resources had not been managed appropriately. 
For example, it transpired that one of the reasons for the shortage of the H1N1 flu vaccine 
was the federal government’s decision to negotiate a sole sourced contract with a single 
Quebec-based supplier. Such an approach to procurement is inconsistent with practices 
adopted in the United States and even inconsistent with Canada’s approach to the production 
of seasonal (rather than pandemic) flu vaccines, where multiple suppliers are utilized in order 
to guard against the impact of a problem experienced in a single manufacturing site.  
Procurement must focus on strategic health needs rather than regional, economic, industrial 
or other criteria.    
The efficiency and effectiveness of public health policies can also be undermined by 
mis-management and corruption. Following the SARS outbreak in Toronto, the province of 
Ontario invested heavily in developing electronic medical records establishing the “eHealth” 
agency. However, by 2009 there was little to show for the investment and Ontario Auditor 
General “slammed” the province for spending more than $1 billion at eHealth and its 
predecessor agency, Smart Systems for Health Agency.   Describing it as the “worst case of 
rule-breaking that he had ever seen” the Auditor General found that: procurement policies 
were circumvented to allow sole sourcing for outside consultants;  board members were 
deceived and former CEO Sarah Kramer operated with virtually no accountability (Greenberg 
2009).  The scandal led to the resignation of a Liberal Minister, but could not alter the fact 
that after nearly a decade of sizeable investment the province was still years away from being 
able to rollout electronic health records. 
The full significance of the eHealth scandal would soon be revealed by the H1N1 
outbreak which demonstrated how crucial electronic health records are to effective 
immunization programs.  The absence of a medical database was later identified as a major 
factor in the confusion and mayhem that accompanied Ontario’s long line-ups for vaccine. 
As Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer for Health confirmed, the need for a database and 
improved technology is pressing: 
[We] do not have the capacity to track and manage an immunization program. 
I am absolutely suggesting that on this, we can do better. The technology exists 
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today. It is a pan-Canadian solution called Panorama that has been in 
development since after SARS. There have been numerous delays to ensure the 
system can be adapted to the needs of all provinces and territories. The time is 
right to move forward. There must be no more delays. Panorama will allow us 
to track who is getting immunized and when. It will help us with surveillance 
so we can be ready to respond to outbreaks of disease. It will improve 
administration, workflow and overall efficiency. It will give us a 21st century 
tool for dealing with pandemics in the 21st century (Ontario Chief Medical 
Officer of Health 2010). 
 
  Further challenges face governments looking to manage resources efficiently.  In 
times of health crises, governments are faced by both responsibility and public pressure to 
provide all available treatments, and must make evidence-based decisions regarding an 
appropriate course of action. This is the case with the flu drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu) that has 
been used increasingly in pandemic situations and has become the focus of recent debates 
about the costs of emergency preparedness. Tamiflu, it should be noted, is not intended to be 
a substitute for the flu vaccine. Instead, it is an antiviral drug (“neuraminidase inhibitor”) that 
is claimed to shorten recovery times and help reduce the symptoms of influenza.  However, 
there is ongoing debate about the evidence base for this class of drugs, with Cochrane 
Collaboration research concluding that effectiveness against the symptoms of influenza is 
modest and that efficacy against complications (i.e. pneumonia) or transmission has not been 
proven (Jefferson et al. 2009). Especially concerning for policymakers,  independent efforts 
to assess the current evidence on treatments of oseltamivir for influenza are limited by a 
paucity of crucial evidence and a lengthy history of unwillingness regarding Tamiflu producer 
Roche’s release of crucial data, even in light of a campaign spearheaded by the prominent 
British Medical Journal (Cochrane Collaboration 2012).2   
However, in spite of the fact that medical evidence about the efficacy of 
neuraminidase inhibitors is mixed, governments around the world have invested billions of 
dollars in order to stockpile oseltamivir.  In Canada alone the government has more than $18-
million (CAD) worth of Tamiflu in federal and provincial warehouses. Tamiflu, like all drugs, 
has a limited shelf-life.  Health officials thus have an ongoing obligation to decide on the 
value of spending public dollars to restock antiviral drugs in case of a future pandemic 
(Alphonso 2012).  This task is complicated, if not compromised, by the limited evidence and 
increased prevalence of reports that some senior public health officials and “independent” 
medical advisors receive payment and benefits from the makers of Tamiflu which have been 
surfacing in the popular press (CBC News 2012).    
A recent audit of PHAC suggests that Tamiflu is just one aspect in a bigger problem 
of stockpiling.  The agency has a national emergency stockpile with an estimated value of 
$300 million which is stored at 10 federal warehouses and 1,300 supply centres throughout 
                                                          
2 The Cochrane Collaboration continues to cite concerns about the availability of evidence 
from the producers, Roche.  In 2009, Roche made a public commitment to share full study 
data with investigators.  After the release of the updated Cochrane review in January 2012, 
for which this full data was still not available, the British Medical Journal launched the 
Open Data Campaign, which “aims to achieve appropriate and necessary independent 
scrutiny of data from clinical trials.”  Focused on Tamiflu as its first initiative, the Open 
Data Campaign may subsequently may help ensure access to the data Roche has not 
fulfilled its obligation to share. 
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Canada (Kennedy 2010).  However, the audit states that “mandate and strategic objectives” 
of the stockpile requires “clarification” because the system dates back to civil defence risks 
stemming from the Cold War and lacks proper maintenance and management (Kennedy 
2010). 
The optics of inefficiency matter, particularly in times of austerity.  Effective public 
health measures do not come cheap.  The total costs of the H1N1 response in Canada are 
estimated to be about $2billion (CAD).  Stockpiling resources for events that may never 
happen, and will more than likely never be used, will always prompt difficult questions about 
efficiency and effectiveness.  Nevertheless, in order to continue funding on the scale required, 
the public needs to see tangible improvements in public health capacity, procedures to assess 
efficacy and ensure evidence-based decision-making, and outcomes and feel confident that 




Missed opportunities and the prospects for reform 
The threat of new airborne infections is ever-present, and requires vigilance and 
preparation to minimize loss of life and serious illness.  The economic costs of pandemics 
can also be devastating to cities and national economies.  With the SARS outbreak in Toronto, 
for example,  Bretscher et al. (2010) estimate that direct health costs to the province of Ontario 
were approximately $945 million (CAD), the long-term impact on tourism cost the industry 
over $700 million (CAD) and, despite being geographically concentrated in Toronto, SARS 
resulted in a 1% – 1.5% decline in the third quarter GDP (2003) growth. They conclude that 
the message for governments is clear: emergency planning and effectively dealing with a 
pandemic crisis is critically important to protect human lives, and the economy as a whole 
(Bretscher et al. 2010). 
In its damning assessment of Canada’s response to SARS, the Campbell Report 
concluded that, “there was an obvious breakdown of communication” between the federal and 
provincial governments that, if not addressed in the future, would place Canadians at greater 
risk of infectious disease and make the country “look like fools in the international 
community” (Campbell 2004).  Anyone who witnessed the subsequent fiasco of the H1N1 
pandemic would have to concur with Campbell’s harsh but fair assessment.   
In spite of the opportunities that SARS and subsequent public health threats have 
provided for learning and adaptation, analysis of the three most recent outbreaks suggests that 
while lessons have been learned, and some improvements made, little has been done in the 
Canadian context to address the fundamental barriers impeding effective emergency 
preparedness and response. It seems that the institutional barriers to change, and to the 
necessary clarification of roles and responsibilities, have been too significant in a federalist 
nation. In assessing prospects for future crises and reform, it is hard not to think that a rare 
opportunity for substantive change in the wake of the SARS crisis has been missed. 
Moreover, in 2013, the prospects for improved intergovernmental cooperation and alignment 
have deteriorated in recent years due to a combination of political, economic and, social 
factors.   
In 2005, shortly  after the SARS outbreak, the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper articulated his vision of “open federalism” as an approach to intergovernmental 
relations composed of four key aspects: ‘‘a recognition and a respect for the constitutional 
division of powers; a recognition that there exists a fiscal imbalance in the federation; a 
commitment to redress this vertical fiscal imbalance; a related commitment to rein in the 
federal spending power in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction; and, finally, a 
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commitment to work with the Council of the Federation to improve the management and 
workings of the Canadian federation’’ (Courchene 2008, 19).   
Despite the pressing need for a re-envisioning of intergovernmental relations and the 
need for a stronger federal role in the sphere of public health, Prime Minister Harper’s 
embrace and promotion of “open federalism”  and “small government”,  reinforced by an 
increasingly restricted fiscal environment,  have diminished significantly the prospects for  a 
stronger and expanded federal role in emergency management.  This supports Fierlbeck’s 
assessment that “federal inaction in public health has become exacerbated 
contemporaneously with a commitment to open federalism” (2010, 17). Harper’s reluctance, 
and to some extent inability,  to take a strong national  leadership role in public health and 
other important sectors such as infrastructure and transportation, is why open federalism has 
also been dubbed “absentee federalism”. 
While “open” federalism may constitute an appropriate political philosophy for 
conceptualizing federalism in the abstract, it has potentially dangerous implications for the 
very real challenges and practicalities of dealing with emergency situations when strong 
leadership and firm decisive action is required.  Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health 
expressed this point powerfully in his report following the H1N1 pandemic:   
We also need to extend our chain of command to the local level. The system as 
it is presently constructed does many things well in what I will refer to as 
“peace time.” In “war time,” however, when people are getting sick and people 
are getting scared, the health system needs to accommodate the kind of strong 
central oversight and management that currently doesn’t exist. The Chief 
Medical Officer of Health must have the authority to direct public health units 
in real time as he or she sees fit. That authority didn’t exist during this 
pandemic. I or my successor needs to have it the next time around (2010). 
 
  Without a determined federal commitment to assume a stronger role, it is difficult 
to see how jurisdictional barriers to change will be addressed, particularly as the provinces 
continue to cherish their independence and are generally unwelcoming of, as many see it, 
federal “incursions” into provincial affairs.   
Perhaps the greatest pressure for Canada to find a solution to this problem will come 
from beyond Canada’s borders. Not only are new and more deadly pandemic threats likely to 
emerge in the near future, but,  Canada is also under pressure to improve its leadership and 
information sharing because of new regulations from the WHO.  As of 2012, new binding 
International Health Regulations (IHRs) came into effect.  Most notably, the IHRs imposed 
upon Canada (as well as all other member states) new obligations in health surveillance and 
management of emergencies. Under the IHRs, Canada is under an obligation to report to the 
WHO any case within Canada’s border that qualifies as a public health emergency of 
international concern and must communicate with the WHO from a single national office. 
According to McDougall, cooperation between all levels of government is “evidently critical” 
if Canada is to meet the requirements of the new IHRs.  The most recent NAPAPI plan may 
also pressure the Canadian, Mexican and US governments into taking a stronger national lead 
in order to fulfill their international obligations to work together to coordinate a North 
American pandemic response.  However it remains to be seen how seriously national 
governments will take commitments to cooperate and share resources when faced with a 
major outbreak and the domestic public and political pressures that will inevitably accompany 
it.   
SARS was thought to be the event that focused Canadians on the need to reform  
public health and provided an opportunity to ensure vital systems were up to task for this and 
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future public health threats. Instead, it became the “wake up call that was never answered” 
(McDougall 2009, 34). Ten years later, as public and media fears of avian flu and other 
pandemic threats have waned, the opportunity to learn from SARS and adapt for subsequent 
emergencies appears to have diminished also.  A combination of international pressure, a 
change in government and/or political ideology and an improving economic situation may 
gradually re-open a window for substantive change.  Ironically, it is, of course, another badly 
mishandled public health crisis that may, devastatingly, provide the greatest impetus for 
change, at potentially great cost to the health, wellbeing, and economic development of the 
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